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| − | + | Could you please repeat that? <a href=" http://morrillsolutions.com/legal.html ">generic proscar canada</a> At a very simple level, Assad’s attack reflects a failure of deterrence. A tenet of U.S. policy, and of collaborative international security efforts, has been preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction or at least preventing or punishing their use. Obviously, in Assad’s calculations, the value of using chemical weapons outweighed what he perceived as the price – his own price – for doing so, a price supposedly to be exacted by the international community. We can’t be sure why he saw the need to use such weapons – he had other options – we know only that he decided he could and should. In that unfortunate choice rests both international and American failures. The essence of deterrence is the perception that a response is likely and that it will be so painful as to stay the hand of a would-be transgressor. We never laid the groundwork to influence that calculation. In fact, our poor credibility in the Middle East and beyond may well have exacerbated the situation, putting a finger on the scale in ways we did not imagine. | |
Revision as of 11:11, 30 August 2014
Could you please repeat that? <a href=" http://morrillsolutions.com/legal.html ">generic proscar canada</a> At a very simple level, Assad’s attack reflects a failure of deterrence. A tenet of U.S. policy, and of collaborative international security efforts, has been preventing the spread and use of weapons of mass destruction or at least preventing or punishing their use. Obviously, in Assad’s calculations, the value of using chemical weapons outweighed what he perceived as the price – his own price – for doing so, a price supposedly to be exacted by the international community. We can’t be sure why he saw the need to use such weapons – he had other options – we know only that he decided he could and should. In that unfortunate choice rests both international and American failures. The essence of deterrence is the perception that a response is likely and that it will be so painful as to stay the hand of a would-be transgressor. We never laid the groundwork to influence that calculation. In fact, our poor credibility in the Middle East and beyond may well have exacerbated the situation, putting a finger on the scale in ways we did not imagine.
